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LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, FOREIGN
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND DR. FRANKLIN'S SNUFF BOX
Gerald S. Schatz*
Legislation-or its Executive or Judicial Branch equivalent-that is intended to
control the operation of the U.S. Government and the conduct of its personnel in
the broad area of ethics rules must be sensitive to definitional details in order to
effectuate its purpose. But legal definitions critical to determining who is a U.S.
Government functionary and what constitutes a federal advisory committee or an
agency or instrumentality of the U.S. Government in any given set of
circumstances are not tidy or consistent.' This problem need not disable any
putatively wide standard of conduct, but it suggests need for particular care in
considering who would be bound and what the underlying law is.
These issues arose in the Spring of 1991 with expressions of concern for possible
foreign conflicts of interest on the part of some of the thousands of people who
serve, often at government request and generally without pay, on committees that
advise U.S. Government agencies on almost every topic with which federal
programs deal. Those concerns-from Congress and the White House-triggered
a Department of Justice Legal Counsel opinion2 that raised more questions than it
answered about these disjointed, sometimes obscure, but, nevertheless, important
areas of the law. Legal Counsel's opinion appeared to increase by thousands the
number of experts who by virtue of temporary assistance to the government might
* Legal Developments Editor. J.D.. District of Columbia School of Law. 1993. BA.. San Francisco
State College, 1967.
This analysis stems from work during a legal internship in 1992 with the Administrative Conference of
the United States. The author is indebted to the staff of the Administrative Conference and especially to Gary
J. Edles, General Counsel, but is solely responsible for otherwise unattributed views herein.
1. The terms "official," "officer," "employee" and "special Government employee" are not synonymous.
Moreover, although these terms are used widely, different statutes use them differently. The statutory
definitions typically are expressly for the purposes of a selected portion of the United States Code. This
discussion uses functionary or functionaries where use of another term would imply unintended legal precision.
Neither is there consistency in the Code and case law in definitions of federal organizations and advisory
committees.
2. 15 Op. O.L.C. 80 (1991) (Preliminary Print).
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be covered by restrictions on their regular employment and sources of income.
Legal Counsel's opinion would reduce the pool of experts otherwise available to the
government; the opinion would rule out policy advisory service by those individuals
receiving income from foreign government sources-not unusual for academics
who lecture abroad occasionally or for lawyer-advisers.
Legal Counsel's opinion on this subject had the clear and unexceptionable intent
of barring advisory service to the Federal Government by individuals who might
have conflicting foreign interests. The problems with the opinion arose because
Legal Counsel sought to achieve that purpose by an overly expansive view of (1)
the law and (2) the potential of even minimal foreign connection for corruption at
home. Although there has been considerable recent controversy over foreign
conflicts of interest, 3 this episode was distinctive. The opinion responded to a
White House request,4 set in motion by Sen. David Pryor (D., Ark.) in a dispute
over practices of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 5
The need to guard against hidden conflict of interest in the conduct of
government is undisputed. Appropriate legal safeguards exist-in statutes,
regulations, security procedures adopted by various governmental and nongovernmental advisory institutions, and in legislation to protect trade secrets.0 Reminding
the agencies of existing ethics law and proscriptions against conflicting involvement
on the part of individuals personally and substantially involved in matters before,
or representation of, the U.S. Government would have presented no new legal
problems. Specific illustrations in light of existing ethics law would have sufficed.
However, Legal Counsel's opinion was so broad that, with threat of prosecution, it
seemed to disqualify from even very brief and unpaid federal advisory service any
3. The author understands that the Reagan and Bush Administrations both sought as a matter of policy
and practice to screen out high-level appointments of individuals with potential foreign involvements, See also
Philip J. Perry, Note, Recently ProposedReforms to the Foreign Agents RegistrationAct, 23 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 133 (1990) (advocating elimination of attorney exemptions from registration).
4. "This responds to your request for our opinion whether 18 U.S.C. § 219 applies to members of
federal advisory committees generally, and in particular to the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and
Negotiation . . . .Section 219(a) makes it a criminal offense for a 'public official' to be or to act as an agent
of a foreign principal required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 .. . . 15 Op.
O.L.C. 80 (1991) (Preliminary Print) at 1.The opinion letter was addressed to John P. Schmitz, Deputy
Counsel to the President.
5. Letter from Sen. David Pryor to Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative, March 16, 1992, reprinted
in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, March 20, 1992, at S-20; letter from Sen. David Pryor to J. Michael Luttig, Assistant
Attorney General, March 16, 1992, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, March 20, 1992, at S-20; Keith
Bradsher, Lobbyists for Foreigners Barred From U.S. Panels, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1992, at D21.
6. See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991);
Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. subpt. 9.5 (1991).
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academic, legal, commercial, or technical expert who had transient and unrelated
foreign involvement.
This article explores some of the assumptions in Legal Counsel's opinion. This
analysis takes the opinion at face value, i.e., the opinion's views of law were stated
in good faith and not merely to frighten the troops.
The range of entities and individuals to whom Legal Counsel's opinion would
apply is not clear; neither are the circumstances in which it would apply. Analysis
of assumptions underlying that opinion implicates numerous issues, including:
definitions of a federal agency; definitions of federal functionaries; definitions of
advisory committees; the scope of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA);1
and the intent behind a constitutional provision never litigated in the Supreme
Court. The latter is the foreign-government Emoluments Clause:
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [the United
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or
foreign State."
The inquiry leads to these conclusions:
-A single problem of governance may sweep through remarkably diverse
areas of law (e.g., imputed income and the Constitution);
-A great deal of basic public law that might be assumed to be consistent and
settled by now remains inconsistent and not settled (e.g., what the Federal
Government is);
-The

Emoluments Clause was intended narrowly, perhaps surprisingly so.

This article examines these issues from the vantage point of the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS). The ACUS (1) is a federal agency
charged with advising the government on broad issues of administrative and
regulatory law and process and (2) functions as if it were an advisory committee."
The ACUS illustrates the difficulty of generalization about government entities or
their people, and it demonstrates how within settled law a federal agency can

7. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991).
8. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8 (cl. 7 in those early texts that combined cl. 5 & c. 6).
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-576 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (to be recodified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-594, per Pub. L
No. 102-354).
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maintain procedural safeguards against conflicts of interest.
I.

BREADTH OF APPLICATION

Legal Counsel's opinion set forth two legal propositions. First, Legal Counsel
sought to apply the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended
(FARA) ° to all members of entities subject to the FACA. This application would
come via a criminal statute-18 U.S.C. § 219 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) ("Officers
and employees acting as agents of foreign principals") 1 1-that in Legal Counsel's
view applies to advisory committee members as well as to persons ordinarily
considered to be federal functionaries. Second, Legal Counsel invoked the
Constitution's Emoluments Clause to bar service on FACA-covered advisory
committees by any person deriving income from a foreign government absent
congressional consent. The chief assumptions underlying both propositions were
that FACA-covered advisory committees are defined clearly and that members of
FACA-covered advisory committees are perforce federal officers, employees, or
special Government employees and hold special positions of trust in the Federal
Government.
Use of the FACA as a defining principle cut a wide and imprecise swath.
Advisory committees that clearly come within the ambit of the FACA number in
the hundreds, and their members, typically paid either per diem or not at all,
number in the thousands. 2
The Congress finds that there are numerous committees, boards, commissions,
councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise officers and
agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government and that they are
frequently a useful and beneficial means of furnishing expert advice, ideas,
and diverse opinions to the Federal Government. 3
The FACA was Congress's attempt to establish some procedural minimums,
including open process and broad representation, for the agencies' use of these
committees and advisors. Congress acknowledged that advisory committees might
be valuable to government programs. Nevertheless, Congress sought in the FACA

10.
11.
12.
13.

22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
18 U.S.C. § 219 subjects federal functionaries to the FARA.
General Serv. Admin., Twentieth Annual Report on FederalAdvisory Committees (1992).
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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to make clear that service on an advisory committee was intended primarily to
benefit the government rather than the advisor. Advisory committee service was to
be a civic contribution, not a private means of access to governmental
decisionmaking."'
Because of severe problems of definition, and because of the great variety of
forms of advisory committees and advisory functions drawn upon by the U.S.
Government, Legal Counsel's opinion could have a reach and effect far different
from its intent. In its current form, the opinion could hinder critical functions
(scientific advisory review, for example) of numerous federal agencies. Debatable
as some of its assumptions may be, that broad an opinion from Legal Counsel may
be a powerful disincentive to public service by persons who fear the risk. The
opinion's expansive definition of "federal employee" does not appear to accord
fully with the FACA when that statute is read in conjunction with other pertinent
federal law. Moreover, the opinion's inclusive view of who is a federal officer,
employee, or special Government employee also raises the possibility of new
sources of potential U.S. Government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).15
The opinion's reach depends in large part on terms that lack adequate definition.
Note, however, that although the law is not clear either (I) as to who is a federal
officer, employee, or special Government employee under what circumstances, or
(2) as to what constitutes a federal advisory committee, the FACA implies very
strongly that an advisory committee member is not necessarily a government
officer or employee. The meaning of "special Government employee" under 18
U.S.C. and the FARA is not clear in all circumstances. Even though the law is not
clear as to either the level of official responsibility or the sources of income that
would bring an individual within the scope of the Emoluments Clause, Legal
Counsel's opinion seems unduly broad.

14.

5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15.

15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Even though the FTCA as a
waiver of sovereign immunity is limited expressly by its definitions, an expanded view of who is a go"ernment
employee for other purposes may invite litigation that propounds a commensurately xpanded view for
purposes of the FTCA.
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II. WHO IS A FEDERAL OFFICIAL, OFFICER, EMPLOYEE,
OR SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE?

The Constitution's usage regarding public officials '1 is inconsistent and reflects
no evident intent to establish terms of art in this regard. The Emoluments Clause
refers to "Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust. 1 The statutory
terminology is inconsistent also but follows concepts of respondeat superior and the
law of principal and agent. As defined in government organization statute, an
"officer" is a political appointee 8 who is:
engaged in the performance of a Federalfunction under authority of law or
an Executive act; and ... subject to the supervision of an authority named
by paragraph (1) of this section, or the Judicial Conference of the United
States, while engaged inthe performance of the duties of his office."'
Similarly, an "employee" is an officer, thus defined, or any other individual who
is appointed in the Civil Service 2" and who is:
engaged in the performance of a Federalfunction under authority of law or
an Executive act; and. . . subject to the supervision of an individual named
by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the
2
duties of his position. '
The same elements of acts and performance of duties appear in the FTCA's
acceptance of liability for conduct of federal officers and employees:
"Federal agency" includes the executive departments, the judicial and
legislative branches, the military departments, independent establishments of
the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the
United States.
"Employee of the government" includes officers or employees of any

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See supra note I concerning terminology.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.
8.
5 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
5 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(2)-(3) (emphasis added).
5 U.S.C. § 2105(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II11991).
5 U.S.C. §§ 2105(a)(2)-(3) (emphasis added).
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federal agency ...and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an

official capacity, temporarily or permanently 22in the service of the United
States, whether with or without compensation.
The case law likewise frames the issue of who is a federal officer or employee in

and
terms of whether the person involved had a duty to act for the government
23
whether that person performed duties under government supervision..
The question may arise as to how broadly the Supreme Court intended its
characterization, in Buckley v.Valeo,2' of the issuance of "advisory opinions" as
one of several "broad administrative powers" 25 and as the "performance of a
significant governmental duty." 26 The Court's pronouncement in this respect is
much narrower than it may appear to be. The Court did not deal with "advisory
opinions" in the sense that this term is used in the usual federal advisory
committee process; that issue was not before the Court in this case. The "advisory
opinions" to which the Court referred in Buckley were not simply advisory but
would have altered the rights and duties of the government and candidates in
federal elections. The term "advisory opinions" as used in Buckley came from the
Federal Election Commission's authorizing statute, which the Court invalidated on
separation-of-powers grounds. The commission's "advisory opinions" would not be
merely advisory; they would alter legal rights and duties.2 7

22. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
23. To determine whether an individual was an employee or an independent contractor for purpo= of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, the D.C. Circuit applied common law agency and
master-servant principles. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). remanding. 486 F.
Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1980), afd,without op., 656 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Accord Cosiner v. United States,
229 Ct. Cl. 87, 665 F.2d 1016 (1981) (holding that there are three elements to the definition of federal
performance of federal function; and supervision by
employee: appointment by authorized employee or officer,
federal employee or officer, and holding that all three elements must be satisfied).
Blackmun, J.. & Rehnquist.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, CJ., White, J.,Marshall. J.,
J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, all on other grounds; Stevens. J.,not participating).
25. Id. at 140.
26. Id. at 141.
27. The statute had provided in pertinent part:
§ 437f. Advisory opinions.
(a) Written requests: written opinions within reasonable time. specific transactions or activities
constituting violations of provisions.
Upon written request to the Commission by any individual holding Federal office, any candidate for
Federal office, or any political committee, the Commission shall render an advisory opinion, in writing.
. . .with respect to whether any specific transaction or activity by such individual, candidate, or political
committee would constitute a violation . ...
(b) Presumptionof compliance with provisions based on good faith actions.
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The Buckley Court distinguished government persons who perform significant
duties from those government persons who do not. The Court noted that while
''any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States is an 'Officer of the United States,' "28 "[e]mployees are lesser functionaries
subordinate to officers of the United States ... ."9 The Court also distinguished
a "significant governmental duty," which "may . . .be exercised only by persons

who are 'Officers of the United States,'" from a duty that "operates merely in aid
of congressional authority to legislate or is sufficiently removed from the
administration and enforcement of public law . . .,,3
The Buckley Court thus characterized as a "significant governmental duty" the
Federal Election Commission "advisory" function that would have established
legal presumptions against violation. The Court did not address ordinary advisory
functions in any other context. Within the meaning of Buckley, an advisory duty
"sufficiently removed from .

.

. administration and enforcement"

is not a

"significant governmental duty." Therefore, the Buckley language on this point is
understood more clearly in its factual context, shown here in brackets:
• . .broad administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions [that are of

legal weight and are issued for the purpose of establishing legal presumption
of compliance], and determinations of eligibility .. .3
[E]ach of these functions [including the issuance of advisory opinions that
are of legal weight and for the purpose of establishing legal presumption of
compliance] . . . represents the performance of a significant governmental
duty exercised pursuant to a public law .... [N]one of them operates merely

in aid of congressional authority to legislate or is sufficiently removed from
the administration and enforcement of public law .... These administrative

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person with respect to whom an advisory opinion Is
rendered under subsection (a) of this section who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions and
findings of such advisory opinion shall be presumed to be in compliance with ... the provision ... with
respect to which such advisory opinion is rendered.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (then codified at 2 U.S.C. ch. 14, subch. 1), reprinted in Appendix to
Per Curiam Opinion, 424 U.S. 144, 168 (italics by the Court).
28. 424 U.S. at 126.
29. Id. at n. 162.
30. Id. at 141.
31. Id. at 140 (bracketed material supplied by the author).
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functions may therefore be exercised only by persons who are "Officers of the
32
United States.
The FACA makes strong distinctions between individuals whose role is solely
advisory and those who act for the government:
The Congress further finds and declares that(6) the function of advisory committees should be advisory only, and that
all matters under their consideration should be determined, in accordance
33
with law, by the official, agency, or officer involved.
By FACA's terminology, then, persons whose role is solely advisory do not act
on behalf of a federal agency. Where advisory services are purchased by the
federal agency (i.e., by a contractor that convenes a study committee), the Federal
Acquisition Regulations make the same point.3'
Legal Counsel cited Dixson v. United States,3 5 in support of the proposition that
advising is an official duty that makes the adviser an officer or employee. 3 But
Dixson, a domestic bribery case, involved no advising. The Dixson majority took
the position that for purposes of the application of the federal bribery statute to
federal employees, the functionaries of a federally supported housing entity were
federal employees. The dissent rejected that expansion of the statute's reach.37 The
Court has declined to view Dixson as standing for any generally inclusive
38
definition of federal employee.

32. Id. at 141 (bracketed material supplied by the author).
33. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b) (emphasis added).
34. (c) Advisory and assistance services shall not be(1) Used in performing work of a policy, decision-making, or managerial nature which is the direct
responsibility of agency officials.
48 C.F.R. § 37.202 (1991).
35. 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984) (5-4 decision).
36. 15 Op. O.L.C. 80 (1991) (Preliminary Print) at 2 n. 3 (April 29. 1991).
37. 465 U.S. at 502-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Rehnquist. & Stevens JJ.).
38. The Court's subsequent treatment of Dixson is instructive for two reasons. First, upon reflection.
Dixson does not support any proposition defining federal functionaries; second, the later treatment of Dixson
exposed gaps and vagueness even in long-standing federal criminal statutes. Declining to use it to expand the
coverage of the conspiracy statute, the Court thus explained Dlxsom
Far from supporting the Government's position in [the instant) case, the reasoning of the Court in Dlxson
illustrates why the argument is untenable. For the purpose of [18 U.S.C.I § 201's prmisions pertaining to
bribery of public officials and witnesses, § 201(a) defined "public official" to include "an officer or
employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency, or branch of
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For purposes of criminal liability in matters subject to the FARA, the federal
criminal code bars public officials other than "special Government employees"
under certain circumstances from representation of foreign interests.89 It uses the
term public official to mean:
...Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner ....or person
acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency, or
branch of Government thereof, . . .in any official function, under or by
authority of any such department, agency, or branch .... 40
Generally, a "special Government employee" is an "officer or employee" who
serves, with or without pay, full-time or intermittently, for not more than 130 days
in any period of 365 consecutive days in the executive branch, the legislative
41
branch, or an independent agency.

Government thereof... in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or
branch of Government." The question presented in Dixson was whether officers of a private, nonprofit
corporation administering the expenditure of federal community development block grants were "public
officials" under §201(a). Although the "on behalf of" language in §201(a) was open to an interpretation
that covered the defendants in that case, it was not unambiguously so. Therefore, the Court found
§ 201(a) applicable to the defendants only after it concluded that such an interpretation was supported
by the section's legislative history ...
.. In Dixson the Court construed § 201(a)'s reference to those acting "on behalf of the United States."
Rather than seeking a particular interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, the Government, in
arguing that [18 U.S.C.] § 371 covers conspiracies to defraud those acting on behalf of the United
States, asks this Court to expand the reach of a criminal provision by reading new language into it. This
we cannot do.
Moreover ....the Government has presented us with nothing to overcome our rule that "ambiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v. United
States ....

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 130-131 (1987) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia observed in a recent
juvenile sentencing case:
I think Dixson weak (indeed, utterly unreasoned) foundation for a rule of construction that permits
legislative history to satisfy the ancient requirement that criminal statutes speak "plainly and
unmistakably," United States v. Gradwell ....
United States v. R.L.C., U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1329, 1341 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy &
Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 219. Unrelated partner or employee activity or income does not necessarily disqualify
the advisory committee member under this section or the FARA or subject the advisory committee member to
prosecution. "Whether such persons are or are not subject to section 219 will depend upon the specific facts of
each case." 15 Op. O.L.C. 80 at 3 n. 5 (1991) (Preliminary Print).
40.

28 U.S.C. § 219(c).

41. 18 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1988); see also Aluminum Co. of Amer. v. FTC (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 589 F.
Supp. 169, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65995 (holding that temporary employees hired under 5 U.S.C,
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An individual who is an agent (other than a lawyer for a disclosed client in a
pending matter) of a foreign principal may serve as a special Government
employee upon agency certification to the Attorney General that such service is in
the U.S. national interest.4 2 Of course, the individual remains subject to all laws
and regulations concerning conflict of interest. The agency's discretion to sidestep
the FARA by declaring an individual's service to be in the national interest is not
available unless that individual is deemed a special Government employee. Where
advisory committees are created by statute the language tends to be situational
and idiosyncratic, sometimes expressly banning federal officers from serving as
43
advisers.
The statutes and the cases indicate overwhelmingly that an individual who
cannot act for the U.S. Government is neither an officer nor an employee of the
government. An individual whose work is purely advisory does not act for the
government. The FACA distinguishes acts from advice, 44 so for the purposes of the
FACA the argument that an advisory committee member is an officer or employee
of the government is very hard to make. The criminal code definition of "special
Government employee" says that such an individual is an officer or employee who
serves for a limited, specified term. If the advisory committee member is not an
officer or employee, then absent powerful rationalization the member obviously
cannot be a special Government employee. Therefore, membership on a federal
advisory committee does not necessarily make the member a federal officer or
employee or a special Government employee. Consequently, the sole fact of
membership on a federal advisory committee should be insufficient to bring the
member within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 219 or the Emoluments Clause. FACA
distinctions notwithstanding, the argument can be made that advising is itself a
governmental act. If so, the occasional advisor who is officially appointed is
arguably a special Government employee.

§ 3109 or special Government employees hired under 18 U.S.C. § 202 need not meet statutory definition of
of
employee in 5 U.S.C. § 2105, inasmuch as in enacting 5 U.S.C. § 3109 Congress wanted to facilitate =.e
employee-consultants by relieving them from restrictions-including close supervision and restrictions on
outside employment-inappropriate to their role and status).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 219(b); see infra.
43. For example, the statute establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Dip!omatic
Documentation for the Department of State (a committee to be appointed by the Secretary of State from
nominees from the American Society of International Law and certain other organizations) proidcs: "No
officer or employee of the United States Government shall be appointed to the Advisory Committee.' 22
U.S.C. § 4356(a)(3)(A) (1988).
44. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(6).
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III.

WHAT IS A FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITrEE?

Even if membership on a federal advisory committee may make the member a
federal officer, employee, or special Government employee, questions remain as to
what constitutes a federal advisory committee. The FACA does not define a
federal "advisory committee" fully. According to the statute, a federal advisory
committee is a committee (other than the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, the Commission on Government Procurement, and
any committee composed wholly of full-time federal officers or employees)
established by statute or reorganization plan, or "established or utilized" by the
President, or "established or utilized" by one or more federal agencies, "in the
interest of obtaining advice or recommendations .

. . .""

As noted above, the

advisory committee's purpose within the meaning of the FACA is "advisory only"
and not to make governmental determinations on the subjects of its advice.' The
General Accounting Office has reported "uncertainties about which types of
47
committees fall under the act.
The FACA applies also to committees for negotiated rulemaking. 48 These
committees are drawn purposely from trade associations and other interest groups.
A question here arises as to whether, by making FACA coverage the touchstone,
Legal Counsel's opinion intended to disqualify from negotiated rulemaking any
organizational representative whose income derives even in part from a foreign
49
government.
The Supreme Court recently has looked at the circumstances to determine
whether an ostensibly nongovernmental advisory entity comes within coverage of
the FACA. In Public Citizen v. United States,"0 the Court put the emphasis on
whether such an entity is "utilized" by a federal agency. In so doing, the Court in
dicta saw as within the FACA's coverage many of the five hundred or more study

45. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3.
46. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(6).
47. Better Evaluations Needed To Weed Out Useless Federal Advisory Committees, Comp. Gen. Rep.
B-127685 at 18 (April 7, 1977).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 585(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
49. A foreign-interest disqualification from participation in negotiated rulemaking might invite a
constitutional challenge. "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the.. . right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. In negotiated
rulemaking, the government furnishes a forum for the convenience of parties, including itself. But negotiated
rulemaking conveys no authority.
50. 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1988) (holding that attention by Department of Justice to American Bar
Association's recommendations for federal judgeships did not bring the ABA within the FACA).
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committees convened under federal contract (from time to time, pursuant to
specific legislation) by the congressionally chartered, but privately administered,
National Academy of Sciences. (The Court thus reconciled that view with the
FACA conference report's assertion that the Act would not apply to contractors or
advisory committees not directly established by or for federal agencies.)
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet expressly overruled an earlier,
1 The lesson of Public
contrary holding by lower courts in Lombardo v. Handler."
Citizen seems to be that there is no settled definition of a FACA-covered advisory
committee.52 Accordingly, a rule that would bring all members of FACA-covered
advisory committees within the coverage of FARA or within the Emoluments
Clause would leave still unsettled the question of who is to be covered.
IV. To WHOM DOES THE FARA APPLY?
Persons required to register under the FARA include individuals, partnerships,
associations, and corporations.53 Nothing in the FARA, however, suggests that one
partner who derives income in part from representation of a foreign principal is
thereby an "agent of a foreign principal" and thereby is individually required to
register. An attorney who represents a disclosed foreign principal in a court or
agency proceeding is not required to register, provided that the representation
"does not include attempts to influence [the U.S. political process] . .. other than
in the course of established agency proceedings . .. ."I No federal public official,
officer, or employee or person otherwise "acting for or on behalf of the United
States . . . in any official function" can be or act as an agent of a foreign
principal 5 within the meaning of the FARA. However, a special Government

51. 397 F. Supp. 792, 796 (D.D.C. 1975). affd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (mem.). cert. denied,
431 U.S. 932 (1977) (FACA inapplicable to motor vehicle emissions study committee convened by the
National Academy of Sciences under federal contract).
52. Accord Richard K. Berg, Multinational Legal Services, P.C., Conflict-of-Interest Requirementsfor
Members of Federal Advisory Committees. Final Report (May 1989), In Administrative Conference of the
United States, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS at 205, 207-211, 229 (1989). For a recent catalogue of court
criticism of the FACA's imprecision, see Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons. Inc. v. Clinton. No. CA
93-0399 (RCL), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2597. at 09 (D.D.C. March 10, 1993) (that the President's Task
Force on National Health Care Reform, an advisory body, is chaired by the President's spouse de not
exempt it from the FACA).
53. 22 U.S.C. § 611(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
54. Id. § 613(g).
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 219(a), 219(c).
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employee can be exempted from this prohibition if "the head of the employing
agency certifies [to the Attorney General] that such [U.S. Government]
employment is required in the national interest." 58
Questions arise as to the breadth of FARA with respect to foreign entities and
the intent behind its exemption from registration in connection with commercial
activities. The exemption is from registration; it does not mean that the exempted
57
individual is not an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning of the Act.
The legislative history of the modern commercial exemption shows intent to apply
the exemption widely but not in blanket fashion. The act is directed against
surreptitious interference with the political process.58 This is not precise guidance,

56.
57.
Rep. No.
58.
The

Id. § 219(b).
"A person may be an agent, according to the definition, but exempt from registration .... H.R.
1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2401.
The legislative history offers this explanation:
commercial

exemption

has

been

broadened ....

Committee

amendment

No.

I

clarifies . . ."activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest." Committee amendment No. 2
makes clear that attorneys at law are not required to register because they engage in legal representation
of foreign principals whose identity they disclose.
H.R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2398.
It exempts from registration persons engaging in activities in furtherance of the bona fide commercial
activities of a domestic person engaged in substantial business here even though a foreign affiliate were
also benefited, but only if three conditions are met: (1)the foreign affiliate must not be a foreign
government or a foreign political party, (2) the activities must not be directed or subsidized in substantial
part by a foreign government or a foreign political party, and (3) the identity of the foreign affiliate must
be disclosed. . . . [P]ersons acting under this exemption would still be agents of foreign principals and
would still be prohibited from making political contributions....
Id. at 2403.
Section 3 would . . . exempt from registration foreign agents engaging in private and nonpolitical
activities with a bona fide commercial purpose, or in political activities when the activities do not serve
predominantly a foreign interest....
The existing provision ... is too narrow to encompass all legitimate commercial activities of agents
for their foreign principals.
The Department of Justice has interpreted the phrase "trade or commerce" as including services and
the committee approves of that interpretation of the Congress' intent. The committee intends that the
exemption as modified by this bill cover the normal professional activities of attorneys, engineers,
architects, and other professional people with foreign clients, including foreign governments, so long as
those activities do not constitute "political activities" as the term is used in the bill. A specific exemption
for attorneys for representation of foreign clients is contained in a subsequent provision, but the day-today, routine activities of attorneys in advising and counseling with foreign clients will continue to be
exempt under this section. When advice is given or assistance is rendered with the intent to influence
[U.S.] Government policy, the agent is engaged in a political activity and the exemption will not apply.
...Foreign governments engage in private activities of a commercial nature which may, or may not,
involve political or policy matters, such as in the case of whole or partial ownership of shipping lines,
airlines, and the like. In some cases, where the interests of a foreign government are so closely related to a
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especially in an era in which governments are involved directly or indirectly with
commercial enterprises, some including the participation of U.S. business entities.
U.S. treatment of foreign business entities may afford useful clues to whether,
on balance, an individual who represents a foreign entity thereby represents a
foreign sovereign. In issues of sovereign immunity, the United States distinguishes
between foreign government commercial entities and foreign governments. The

United States does not concede sovereign immunity to foreign government
commercial enterprises."9 U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law provides no
absolute guide. Treatment of the foreign business entity as commercial or as
governmental depends on the entity's specific conduct. The sovereign immunity
case law is firm, however, in recognizing that foreign government commercial
activities are not necessarily political."
commercial enterprise or to one or two products, such as coffee or sugar, that there is obrviously some
direction or control from the foreign government, the agent's activities would of necessity promote the
political and public interests of the foreign country. The commercial agents ... for governments with
state trading companies will also present administrative problems. Obviously. .'I commercial
arrangements with state-owned enterprises will not come within the purview of the act a idthere will no
doubt be an increase in agency relationships which qualify for the exemption ....It is expected that the
Department of Justice will, by regulation, establish criteria to provide guidance ....
[T]he problem has been to exempt bona fide. legitimate business representation without at the same
time exempting ...

improper activities ....

Section 3(d) of the act . . . exempts from registration (1) any person engaged in private and
nonpolitical activities in furtherance of bona fide trade or commerce of a foreign principal ....
Id. at 2405-2407.
59. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ I n.,1330. 1332, 1391. 1441. 1602-1631
(1988 & Supp. II1990). The act provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of this chapter(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity(1)which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of who,; shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof ....
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference
to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.
Id. § 1603.
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id. § 1605.
60. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 689, 697-706 (1976) (foreign go'.cmient's
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Legal treatment of the U.S. Government's own corporations in this regard is not
a clear guide. The FTCA does not equate U.S. Government corporations with
federal agencies except in reference to a very few named entities."' The FTCA
offers no further guidance on this point. The FTCA case law includes common-law
62
agency analyses but establishes no clear pattern.
For the purposes of Legal Counsel's opinion, then, representation of a foreign
government entity is not a fact easily defined. The trend of the law on the whole is
toward recognition of foreign government-supported commercial enterprises as
merely commercial. But such an entity could by its conduct bring its U.S. agent
within the scope of the FARA.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act amendments of 1966,03 modernized the
FARA64 to strengthen it generally, to free up purely commercial transactions, to
eliminate old, wartime implications of restrictions on civil liberties, and to bring

commercial venture not necessarily an act of state; U.S. Government's position upheld); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943) (absent Department of State recognition of foreign defendant's claim of sovereign
immunity in admiralty dispute, district court had authority to decide whether to grant immunity); Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945) (admiralty; "the court will inquire whether the ground of [sovereign]
immunity claimed is one which it is the established policy of the [State] department to recognize"). The
Department of State long has taken the view that commercial and private activities of foreign governments do
not give rise to sovereign immunity. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698 (State Department quoted); see also Appendixes
I and 2 to the Court's opinion, 425 U.S. at 706-15.
61. The FTCA offers no definitions beyond the following:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term "Federal agency"
includes the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments,
independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2671.
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(I) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a
bank for cooperatives.
Id. § 2680.
62. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of II., 877 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. acting as receiver of failed national bank was federal agency
for purpose of FTCA); Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding Federal Reserve Banks
outside the reach of FTCA inasmuch as they are locally controlled, independently operated although heavily
regulated, and receive no appropriated funds); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding
that Amtrak is not a federal agency or instrumentality for FTCA purposes).
63. Pub. L. No. 89-486.
64. Later to be amended further and codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621.
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federal officials within its reach. 65 Enactment of the federal officials provision,
which became the core of 18 U.S.C. § 219, was without allusion, let alone
reference, to the Constitution's Emoluments Clause. The legislative history is
otherwise unenlightening,6 6 except that it makes clear that in this statutory context
a foreign government's commercial instrumentality is not necessarily synonymous
with its parent government." Therefore the mere representation, for commercial
purposes only, of a foreign government commercial entity should not bring the
agent within the class of individuals required to register under the FARA.

V.

WHO COMES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE?

The Emoluments Clause applies to any "Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them [the United States] ."68 The obvious distinction between "Office"

65. H.R. Rep. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397. 2398-2399.
66. This is the entire commentary of the House Committee on the Judiciary on this subject:
Section 8(b) would amend chapter ii of the United States Code. title 18. by adding a new section
relating to conflicts of interest involving foreign agents.
The new section would make it a felony for any agent of a foreign principal required to register
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 to act as an officer or employee of the U.S.
Government or any agency thereof.
The section would except from its prohibition any agent whose employment was certified as required
in the national interest by the head of the employing agency. Any such certificate would be mde a part
of the public records relating to the agent on file with the Department of Justice.
Id. at 2411.
The House conferees reported:
House amendment No. 2 in substance exempts from registration any person qualified to practice law.
insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before
any court of law or any agency or official of the Government (other than a Member or committee of
Congress).
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1632, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2416. 2417.
67. The House conferees reported:
The committee has considered the desirability of eliminating the word "private" from the exemption.
...Rabinowitz v. Kennedy [376 U.S. 605, 608 (1964) (U.S. lawyers representing Cuban government
agencies obligated to register under FARA)] caused some uncertainty as to whether a foreign
government could ever act in a private capacity within the meaning of the commercial exemption. The
Department of Justice . . . recognizes that a foreign government can act in a private capacity for
purposes of this act. The committee agrees with that view and has decided against eliminating the word
because of possible difficulties.., in enforcing the act ... where a commercial activity of a foreign agent
promotes the political and public interests of the foreign governmental principal....
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1632. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2405; accord, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 1632, supra, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2417.
68. U.S. Const. art. I. § 9, cl. 8.
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and "Office of Profit or Trust" implies strongly that the framers did not intend to
bring all U.S. Government employment within the clause's coverage. Otherwise,
the Constitution offers no guidance on this subject. The Supreme Court never has
ruled on the question of what constitutes an "Office of Profit or Trust" under that
clause. The Court did rule in Buckley that "any appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United
States,' "69 and, "[e]mployees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the
U nited States . . .. ,, o

Emoluments Clause jurisprudence is extremely limited. It amounts to a few
inconsistently decided lower-court federal claims cases that involved military
pensioners and reservists and that led Congress to consent expressly to foreign
government employment of active and retired reservists (so they could continue to
serve as U.S. reservists or continue to collect U.S. pensions).7 2 In so doing,
Congress did not attempt to categorize federal positions. The statutory categories
and definitions of federal personnel do not track the constitutional terminology but,
as noted above, do distinguish generally between individuals who have authority to
act and individuals who lack that authority.
In occasionally consenting to exceptions to the Emoluments Clause, Congress
has done so without examining whether that proscription really applied-for
example, to foreign military decorations and to foreign employment of retired
veterans. In specifically regulating against foreign conflicts of interest on the part
of U.S. Government personnel, however, Congress did not find any necessity to
invoke the clause. In the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966,72 Congress
commented on the Emoluments Clause only to the extent of assuming (without
elaboration) its applicability to foreign military decorations and gifts of minimal
value. On that assumption, Congress replaced a diplomatically awkward
arrangement for their acceptance only through the Department of State and

424 U.S. at 126.
70. Id. at 126, n. 162 (citations omitted).
71. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-105, § 509, 91 Stat. 844,
859-860 (1977) (codified at 37 U.S.C. § 908 (1988). This statutory exemption for retired veterans originated
in an authorization amendment, enacted without controversy, following introduction by Senator Strom
Thurmond (R., S.C.) with this explanation (in pertinent part):
Mr. President, retired members of the uniformed services and other Government retirees arc denied their
retired pay. This is due to a questionable interpretation by the Comptroller General (Ward v. United
States] of a phrase in the Constitution which I do not believe was intended by the framers . . ..
123 Cong. Rec. 19,473 (1977).
72. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2621-2626 (1988).
69.
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instead gave blanket consent to individual acceptance.
Ward v. United States,7 4 which had prompted the congressional consent to
foreign government employment of U.S. reservists and veterans, is the single
consequential piece of Emolument Clause litigation in the modern era, and it
remains inconclusive. The case was consequential chiefly because it prompted the
change in the law affecting reservists and veterans. It is inconclusive because a
comment by Chief Commissioner Willi that the applicability of the Emoluments
Clause in these circumstances "is doubtful, as a matter of law," inasmuch as it
was intended to apply only to high-level officials, was determined by the Court of
Claims to be "surplusage" and "not necessary to support the conclusion which he
75
and we have reached."
In the absence of direct judicial commentary and in light of Buckley and the
approach that Congress has taken in defining and distinguishing among federal
personnel categories, no firm legal basis is apparent for the assumption that all
federal personnel automatically come within the scope of the Emoluments Clause.
Officers, public officials, and some employees obviously hold positions within the
clear intent of the clause; the same cannot be said for persons whose role is solely
advisory.
The Constitution's Framers evidently intended its Emoluments Clause narrowly,
both as to what kinds of officials of the United States are covered and as to the
meaning of foreign state. The circumstances of the clause's adoption and the few
direct comments on it from the Framers suggest that in this regard the Framers
were concerned primarily with U.S. officials whose U.S. Government
responsibilities involved them with foreign governments. Contemporary usage,
notably by the delegate who moved the clause's adoption, suggests that the
reference to foreign states was to foreign sovereigns rather than to any foreign
entity or to any foreign governmental entity that could not represent its sovereign.
The Framers adopted the clause perfunctorily, on motion of Mr. Pinckney (of
South Carolina) and without dissent.

It was moved and seconded to insert the following clause after the 7 section of
the 7 article.

73.
74.
grounds
75.

H.R. Rep. No. 2052, 89th Cong., 2d Scss. (1966). reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3462. 3463.
44 Comp. Gen. 130 (1964), revd Comm'r CI. Ct. (Cong. Ref. Case No. 6-76. 1982), affd on other
I C1. Ct. 46 (1982).
1 Cl. Ct. at 49.
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"No person holding any office of profit or trust under the "United States,
shall without the consent of the Legislature "accept of any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind "whatever, from any king, prince, or
76
foreign State" which passed in the affirmative.
The language comes from the Articles of Confederation:
No state, without the consent of the United States in congress assembled,
shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any
conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty, with any king, prince, or state; nor
shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States,
or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind
whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States
1
in congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility2
This language suggests that the Framers had in mind principally those officials
who deal with foreign states in the course of their official responsibilities.
Similarly, according to James Madison's account for a portion of the same day:
Mr Pinkney urged the necessity of preserving foreign ministers & other
officers of the U.S. independent of external influence and moved to
insert-after Art VII sect 7. the clause following-"No person holding any
office of profit or trust under the U.S. shall without the consent of the
Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State which passed nem:
78
contrad.
John Randolph left little doubt that the Framers were concerned here with
officials responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. Governor Randolph was
reported to have thus explained the provision to the Virginia Convention:
The last restriction restrains any persons in office from accepting of any
present or emolument, title or office, from any foreign prince or state. It must
76.

Journal, Aug. 23, 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 381 (Max

Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand] (text and punctuation as in Farrand).
77. U.S. Arts. Confed. of 1778, art. 6, in I U.S. Laws 1789-1815 (ann.) at 13, 15 (3.B Colvin ed.,
Bioren, Dane, & Weightman pubs., 1815) [hereinafter U.S.L.] (photo. reprint 1989).
78. 2 Farrand at 389 (text and punctuation as in Farrand).
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have been observed before, that though the confederation had restricted
congress from exercising any powers not given them, yet they inserted it, not
from any apprehension of usurpation, but for greater security. This restriction
is provided to prevent corruption. All men have a natural inherent right of
receiving emoluments from any one, unless they be restrained by the
regulations of the community. An accident which actually happened, operated
in producing the restriction. It was thought proper, in order to exclude
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving
or holding any emoluments from foreign states. I believe, that if at that
moment, when we were in harmony with the king of France, we had supposed
that he was corrupting our ambassador, it might have disturbed that
confidence, and diminished that mutual friendship, which contributed to carry
79
us through the war.
Madison, who spoke next, did not comment on Randolph's remarks but went on
to another subject. The problem to which Randolph alluded appears to have been
Benjamin Franklin's apparent acceptance of a snuff box from Louis XVI.80
No such provision was in Franklin's 1775 draft Articles of Confederation."' The
predecessor clause in the Franklin draft dealt with centralization of the foreign
relations function under the Congress. 82
A July 12, 1776 draft provided:
. . . nor shall any Colony or Colonies, nor any Servant or Servants of the

United States, or of any Colony or Colonies, accept of any Present,
Emolument, Office, or Title of any Kind whatever, from the King or Kingdom
of Great-Britain, or any foreign Prince or State; nor shall the United States
assembled grant any Title of Nobility."3
79. Robertson, Debates of the Convention of Virginia. 1788 (2d ed. 1805) at 321-345. reprinted in 3
Farrand 327.
80. 3 Farrand 327 n. 1. Proof that Dr. Franklin, ambassador to France, actually accepted the snuff box
from the king of France is indirect but fairly convincing (a box with the appropriate kind of markings
ultimately was found among the possessions left after Dr. Franklin's death). However, whether the rumor of
the gift was true is beside the point; as is evident from the discussion, the rumor was sufficient cause for
concern at the time.
81. See Nathaniel C. Towle, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONsriTTION OF TIUE UNITED STATES
318 (1871) (photo. reprint 1987).
82. Id.
83. Draft art. 4, reprinted in Thurston Greene, TiE LANGUAGE OF TlE CoNsutnTo. 459 (1991)
[hereinafter Greene].

162

ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT

On June 18, 1787, during a discussion of revision of the Articles of
Confederation, Alexander Hamilton had mentioned his own constitutional design,
which he did not submit to the Convention. He did allow copies to circulate,
however.8 4 Article IX, section 7 of the Hamilton plan provided:
No person having an office or place of trust under the United States shall
without permission of the Legislature accept any present emolument Office or
title from any foreign Prince or State. 5
The Federalist essays do not elaborate directly on the clause. A contemporary
pamphleteer, not one of the Framers, commented:
The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exercise in our affairs
was foreseen, and a wholesome provision has been made against it; for no
person holding an office under the United States is permitted to enjoy any
foreign honours, powers or emoluments.88
Neither does a modern commentary, by Professors Rotunda and Nowak, elaborate
except to say: "These constitutional prohibitions clearly relate only to official
persons .... s7 They use the following illustration:
A United States minister who is abroad may render a friendly service to a
foreign power and even negotiate a treaty for it, but he may "not become an
officer of that power" nor may he accept "a formal commission, as minister
plenipotentiary [because that] creates an official relation between the
individual thus commissioned and the government which in this way accredits
him as its representative. . .
Op.Atty.Gen. 409 (1854).88

."

13 Op.Atty.Gen. 538 (1871). See also, 6

The foregoing suggests that the Framers' concern with corruption from foreign
governments stemmed primarily from concern for the possible corruption of

84. 3 Farrand 617-630.
85. Alexander Hamilton, reprinted in 3 Farrand 619, 629 (text and punctuation as in Farrand).
86. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution for the United States of America, No. 4, October
21, 1787, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 150 (Paul L. Ford cd., 1888), quoted
in Greene 472.
87. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 1 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.18.
88. Rotunda & Nowak, § 9.19 n. 3.
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foreign relations. Even then, Madison observed:
Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our
federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how
has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? The
Congress . . . held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they
had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations .... Yet we know

by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity
of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers
of calumny. 9
Madison's expression was in the context of proposed powers of the Executive, and
in this instance there was no mention of the Emoluments Clause. Perhaps the
allusion was to the snuff box reportedly given to Dr. Franklin.
The Emoluments Clause's reference to foreign states was a reference to foreign
governments' acts in their sovereign capacity, as distinguished from the acts of
foreign chartered corporations and of foreign governmental entities without the
legal capacity to represent the national sovereign. Although the records of the
Convention are silent on this particular point, the congress under the Articles of
Confederation in the period immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention
expressly recognized the distinction and used the term "foreign states" and
"power" to refer to the sovereign. Even against the background of a maritime law
that symbolically equated ships with the sovereign, the congress distinguished
between the foreign state and its subjects (and their ships). The records include
this phraseology:
• .. ships belonging to, or navigated by, subjects of powers with whom the
United States shall not have formed treaties of commerce, and to prohibit the
subjects of foreign states .... 90
and in a report whose authors included the same Mr. Pinckney who later
introduced the Emoluments Clause at the Constitutional Convention:
. . . goods, wares, or merchandise, from being imported into, or exported

89. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 344 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
90. Proceedings Which Led to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States. ch. 3. I U.S.L at
47. The record here thus distinguishes between foreign powers and their subjects.
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from, any of the states, in vessels belonging to, or navigated by, the subjects of
any power ....
91
Even a proposed constitutional amendment that would have revoked the U.S.
citizenship of any U.S. citizen accepting any kind of benefit from a foreign power
was qualified to make clear that only the foreign sovereign was meant. 92
The few, brief accounts of the Emoluments Clause in records and pertinent
memoirs of the Constitutional Convention and in records of its predecessor clause
in the Articles of Confederation do not consider whether or how the clause might
apply to income derived from foreign governments through the families or business
associations of federal officials. The topic apparently did not arise. (Neither was
the possibility of conflict of interest by business association discussed, although
some of the Framers said in other contexts that they would forsake other vocation

if appointed to federal office.) Neither the clause on its face nor the records and
memoirs of its adoption furnish any basis for a doctrine of imputed income or
93
imputed disqualification under the Emoluments Clause.
The Treasury Department concluded recently, but without explanation, that
income received by an otherwise covered federal official from a foreign government
through family or a business association is not covered by Emoluments Clause (the
assumption is that the income is not a disguised pass-through). 9' Such income may
be disqualifying under various conflict-of-interest statutes and regulations,
however.
91. Report of a committee, consisting of Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Henry, Oct. 23, 1786, Id.
(text and punctuation here and in text as in original).
92. This proposed amendment was introduced in the second session of the 1 th Congress but was not
ratified:
ARTICLE 13
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honor,
or shall, without the consent of congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of
any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a
citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or
either of them.
Ch. 4, 1 U.S.L. at 74; see n. at 72, n. at 74. The proposed amendment of course would have imposed a drastic
penalty. The Emoluments Clause left standing is not self-implementing, and Congress has not seen fit to write
implementing legislation.
93. Does the language "accept of" in the Emoluments Clause imply a theory of imputed
disqualification? The "of" in "accept of" probably is no more than one of many now archaic flourishes. A
consistent theory of partnership, from which imputed disqualification would derive, did not evolve until much
later. See, e.g., Unif. Partnership Act Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1969).
94. Representing Foreign Principals, Treas. mem. 2, n. 5 (July 6, 1992).
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In addressing specific cases, both as to who is covered by the Emoluments
Clause and as to imputed income, the Department of Justice has not found the
Clause to apply widely. The secretary of the executive committee of the
Centennial Exhibition was appointed by the presidentially appointed exhibition
commission but not by the President or a department vested with the appointment
power, and so he was deemed not an officer of the United States within the
meaning of the Emoluments Clause.95 An individual who was employed
intermittently as a field assistant by the U.S. Geological Survey, who was paid by
the day, and who never took an oath of office was deemed not an officer of the
United States and therefore was allowed to accept a Knighthood of the North Star
from the King of Sweden."6
While noting that the framers intended the Emoluments Clause to apply to high
officials such as foreign ministers, the Department of Justice found the same policy
justifiable in refusing a Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer's request for
leave to work through a consulting firm that the applicant and other Commission
employees had established in order to do business with the Mexican government on
a project for which they had previously worked as U.S. Government employees.07
The opinion implies that these U.S. Government employees improperly exploited
their official U.S. Government relationship with the Mexican government. The
opinion noted that invocation of the Emoluments Clause depends on the particular
circumstances, here involving the secrecy of the field. 8 Even in this case, although
discussing the policy assumed to underlie the Emoluments Clause, the Department
stopped short of expressly invoking the clause itself.
The Department has ruled that the Emoluments Clause's reference to foreign
entities refers to a foreign government and its regular executive, if that entity or
individual could bestow an office or decoration or title of nobility on that
government's behalf.99 In the Department's view, the Emoluments Clause was not
intended to deal with foreign government reimbursements for salaries of employees
detailed abroad.109 A consulting firm in which the federal employee is a principal
will not in itself shield the employee from Emoluments Clause coverage, where the

95. 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 187 (1877).
96. 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 598 (1911).

97. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 156 (1982).
98. Id.
99. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 116 (1902) (Prussian prince's gift of photographs to US. military and civlian
officers deemed acceptable as gift to U.S. Government).
100. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 513 (1947) (Weather Bureau personnel assisting government of Eire pursuant to

U.S. statute).
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clause would apply otherwise. 101 But someone who holds an otherwise covered
federal position and who as a university employee performs consulting services for
a foreign government and is paid by the university, although with foreign
government funds, but has no contr6l over assignment or payment, was not
02
considered the recipient of a foreign government emolument.1
Even in the absence of an established Emoluments Clause jurisprudence, then,
the history, the rulings of the Department of Justice, and the surrounding law all
argue for a narrow interpretation. The Clause addresses the problem of conflict of
interest on the part of a U.S. Government functionary vis-a-vis a foreign sovereign
in a sovereign capacity. The Clause thus may not be assumed to disqualify from
U.S. Government service, for examples, any of the following individuals: an
academic paid by a foreign government university for a summer course; or a
Foreign Service officer whose Washington house is leased to an individual from a
foreign government with which the officer does not deal; or an engineer or lawyer
who derives partnership income through a colleague's work for a foreign
government in an unrelated area.

VI.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

The Administrative Conference of the United States is at once a federal agency
and a federal advisory committee, and it addresses cross-cutting issues of
regulatory and administrative law and process. The Conference thus serves as an
example of (1) the difficulty of generalizing about government agencies,
functionaries, and advisory committees, and (2) how agencies can maintain
procedural safeguards against conflicts of interest, whether foreign or domestic,
without stretching the interpretations of settled law.
The ACUS has a mandate to draw from its own resources, from elsewhere in
the government, and from the general public to advise the government on
administrative and regulatory procedures. 0 3 As in many institutions with advisory
functions, its structure is unique. The ACUS consists of not more than 101 nor less
than 75 members. These include a paid chairman (appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate); department and agency heads (or their
designees); and other presidentially appointed members. There are public members

101. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 156.
102. Id.
103. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-576.
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chosen by the chairman with the consent of a Council, which consists of the
chairman and 10 other presidentially appointed members. Additionally, the
chairman may appoint special counsels, who are chosen for their expertise but
have no vote except in committee.'" The ACUS also has a paid staff. In these
organizational circumstances, and in view of problems of legal definition,
ascertaining precisely who among ACUS members and other participants in its
work are federal officers, employees, special Government employees, or ordinary
citizens borders on impossibility. As the Administrative Conference has advised
generally:
[D]istinctions among advisory committee members between special
Government employees, on the one hand, and representatives and independent
contractors, on the other, are extremely fine, difficult to administer
consistently, and, in any event, cannot be justified in terms of protecting the
Government from self-interested advice. In practice they result in agencies
requiring too little disclosure from the members who are not SGE's, while
imposing significant burdens, principally criminal liability, on those members
105
who are SGE's.
The ACUS is empowered to promulgate procedural "bylaws and regulations"'10
consistent with its charter and has done so, establishing disclosure and
disqualification requirements intended to safeguard against conflicts of interest.1ca
The ACUS understands that FACA's procedural precepts and regulations
thereunder 08 apply to it in its advisory role. The ACUS' organic act and
appropriations legislation would supersede FACA in the event of conflict100
The ACUS does not concede but notes the possibility 1 that its non-government
members may be deemed special Government employees within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 202 and therefore may be bound by criminal code provisions"'
applicable to special Government employees as well as to federal officers and

104. 5 U.S.C. § 573.
105. Berg, supra n. 52, at 229.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(2).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

1 C.F.R. §§ 302.5, 303.102-303.109 (1992).
41 C.F.R. § 101-6.10 (1991).
5 U.S.C. § 4(a) (1988).
1 C.F.R. § 302.5(a)(1).
5 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1988).
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employees. The ACUS' conflict-of-interest disclosure and disqualification rules"'
extend to any circumstance in which the ACUS's work is likely to affect the
substantive outcome directly, and to his or her knowledge the member or his or her
spouse, minor child, partner, partnership, firm, employer, or prospective employer
has a financial interest in that outcome. 1 3
The ACUS's rules with respect to special Government employees1 14 incorporate
by reference the rules set forth in the federal employee standards of conduct,"16
which include an express proscription against exploitation of public responsibility
for private gain. Note also that a special Government employee who serves no
more than 60 days within the preceding 365 days is exempt from rules restricting
that person's acting as an attorney or agent in a pending proceeding except before
his or her department or agency. 1 6 The ACUS applies its disclosure and
disqualification requirements to all participants in all of its activities. The agency
does so even though it does not necessarily consider as a federal employee (of
whatever category) someone whose only connection to the Federal Government is
advisory service on an advisory committee that it may convene.
Relying in large part on the Federal Personnel Manual, the Department of
Justice took the view several years ago that public members of the ACUS are
special Government employees, under 18 U.S.C. § 202(a).117 Because the law is
far from settled as to who is what kind of a federal employee in what
circumstances, the ACUS reached no conclusion as to the federal employee status
of all of the members of the Conference and advisory committees that it convenes.
As a matter of propriety, consistent with its statutory charter and with the 1978
Department of Justice opinion, the ACUS (1) proceeds as if its public members
are special Government employees, and (2) requires all of its members, public and
private, to comply with conflict-of-interest statutes, regulations, and executive
orders. Consistent with the 1978 opinion of Legal Counsel, the ACUS has
determined that where its work "is not directed to and is unlikely to affect the
112. 1 C.F.R. §§ 302.5, 303, pursuant to Part III of Exec. Order No. 12,674, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,159
(1989), reprinted as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,547 (1990), in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(Supp. III 1991). Exec. Order No. 12,674 applies to "any officer or employee of an agency, including a special
Government employee." Id. § 502(b). If these straightforward, orthodox references to executive orders do not
suggest exactly what the relevant law is, then perhaps clarification of guidance to federal functionaries might
deserve a higher priority in the attack on potential for conflict of interest.
113. 1 C.F.R. § 302.5(b).
114. 1 C.F.R. § 303.107.
115. 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.302-735.306 (1992).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 205(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
117. Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Jan. 3, 1978).
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substantive outcome of any pending judicial matter or administrative proceeding
involving a specific party or parties (other than the United States)" in which a
member to his or her knowledge has a financial interest, then under the
disqualification provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 208(b) that financial interest "is too
remote to affect the integrity of the member's service to the Conference."' 18
At least those public members who are appointed by the President are special
Government employees (the chairman is a full-time government official and is
otherwise covered). As such, under 18 U.S.C. § 219(b), they may not
simultaneously be or act as an agent of a foreign principal (except as attorney for
a disclosed client in an unrelated proceeding), absent special certification of need
for their membership in the Administrative Conference. The ACUS has made
such certifications from time to time, both for individuals who clearly are special
Government employees and for individuals who may be special Government
employees.
The possibility of imputed disqualification of an ACUS participant solely
because of representation of a foreign interest by the participant's business
associate or because of the participant's sharing in income from that
representation does not arise under 18 U.S.C. § 219 or the FARA. By the ACUS'
own conflict-of-interest rules, however, the participant would be disqualified by any
substantive financial interest in the outcome of the ACUS activity. Because the
ACUS's public members do not act for or perform substantive duties for the
government, their advisory services do not bring them within the scope of the
Emoluments Clause.

VII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Conflicts of interest or foreign government involvements, whether actual or
potential, should be disclosed as a matter of open government and integrity. Such
conflicts are not necessarily undesirable, however. Differing viewpoints may be
sought purposely. Needed expertise may reside outside the United States. The
problem for the federal advisory process is to ensure that any conflict or potential
conflict is disclosed and that any advisor with a substantive personal or
institutional interest in the outcome be disqualified from participation in
recommendations. The ACUS has fashioned its rules accordingly.
Safeguards against hidden conflicts of interest may be strengthened by
118.

1 C.F.R. § 302.5(b)(2).
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disclosure and disqualification practices within existing agency authority and
without having to rely on unsettled law. Under its own statutory authority, the
ACUS has established regulations to guard against hidden conflicts of interest in
its advisory as well as its operational functions. Most other agencies have similar
authority, and for several agencies security clearance and classification procedures
are in effect as well. For advisory services under contract, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations require the contracting officer to identify, evaluate, and avoid,
neutralize, or mitigate significant potential conflicts of interest. These conflicts are
defined in part as "activities or relationships with other persons" that would make
46a person . . . unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or

advice" or would otherwise impair objectivity."1 9
Legal Counsel's opinion certainly stimulated agency concerns. Attorney Laurie
Sherman, of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (the agency that was the
opinion's original target), called it overly broad and not legally justifiable.1 20 The
General Services Administration's Committee Management Secretariat, the
government's FACA monitor, reported that on the basis of Legal Counsel's
opinion "many Federal agencies are requiring their FACA advisory committee
members who are currently registered as foreign agents under FARA to either
resign their committee membership or terminate, if possible, their foreign agent
'
registration."121
The Committee Management Secretariat "advised its agency
committee management contacts to carefully consider this issue with their staff
22
counsels and ethics officials.'
While prompting nervousness in the agencies and raising questions among
lawyers who serve on advisory committees but may have unrelated foreign
representational commitments, Legal Counsel's opinion seems not to have
strengthened the settled and enforceable safeguards against conflicts of interest.
On balance, Legal Counsel seems to have equipped prosecutors with a questionable
theory while leaving federal agencies uncertain and intimidating those would-be
advisory committee members who may have foreign but innocent connections.
As the structure of the ACUS illustrates, U.S. Government agencies do not fit a
single pattern. Whether an individual is a special Government employee in
consequence of being on a federal advisory committee may be an uncertain
119. 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.501, 9.504.
120. Justice Defines Foreign Agents, USTR Objects, FED. B. ASS'N SELECT COMM. ON FACA
NEWSLETrER, October 1992, at 2.
121. Foreign Agents Registration Act, GENERAL SERV. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADMIN. REV., Sept. 30, 1992, at
122. Id.
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proposition on which to bring a pr6secution. Whether a committee organized for
the government's purposes and charged specifically with the task of advising the
government comes within the ambit of the FACA may be too uncertain to make
the FACA a useful organizing principle for any aspect of federal ethics law.
Apparently narrow purpose and a lack of substantial, directly pertinent
jurisprudence make the Emoluments Clause a similarly inadequate basis for
strengthening federal ethics law. Combining the two-the FACA and the
Emoluments Clause-has the effect of unsettling the agencies and their potential
advisors but does not appear to do anything protective that cannot be done within
the settled law, clearer guidance, and stronger enforcement.
Accordingly, the Department of Justice may wish to give this subject further
attention. As the New York Times reported, quoting an unidentified official of the
Clinton Administration on difficulty in formulating promised new ethics rules:
"[1I]t's very complicated stuff. . . . [T]his is going to bind everyone. There are
constitutional issues and legal issues." 12 3 The rules that emerged initially cover
only senior political appointees and are couched in terms of contract-the
requirement of an "Ethics Pledge" in return for a presidential or vice-presidential
appointment to office. 2 ' The broader legal muddle raised by Legal Counsel's 1991
opinion on the subject remained untouched.

123. Richard L. Berke, Ethics Rules Bog Down the Transition. N Y Tt m., Dec. 2. 1992. at B10.
124. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 50 Fed. Reg. 5.911 (1993). The order requires "Ethics Pledges" from
full-time, paid, non-career trade negotiators and full-time, paid, non-career senior executive appointees taking
office on or after Jan. 20, 1993 to abstain for life from any activity that would require registration under the
FARA and to abstain for five years after leaving office from advising or representing any foreign governmtnt.
foreign political party, or foreign business entity with the intent of influencing an official decision by an officer
or employee of the U.S. Government- The order exempts representation of disclosed principals in judicial and
administrative proceedings, and it exempts charitable and academic involvement and participation in
international organizations.

